ENGINEERING CASE STUDY

InfraGuard

Source-backed AWS Security Hub remediation hardening: live-state verification, Terraform ownership and fail-closed proposal eligibility.

Domain
AWS security / Remediation assurance
Evidence
Open Security Hub hardening PR; not part of the released main branch
Limitations
Design and tests in an unmerged, draft pull request; no production deployment

What this workstream is

InfraGuard refers here to the Security Hub remediation hardening workstream under the existing InfraGuard Agent repository, not a separate source repository or a second deployed product. The distinction matters: the Agent’s released prototype and the newer hardened AWS path have different evidence boundaries.

Problem and trust boundary

An alert is not adequate authority to change infrastructure. The proposed hardening flow validates a supported Security Hub event, independently checks live EC2 security-group rules, binds account, region and resource identity, and requires evidence that Terraform owns the resource before a proposed change can proceed.

Ambiguous resource ownership or inconclusive state observations must fail closed.

Current evidence

InfraGuard Agent PR #5 contains the Security Hub hardening implementation. At the time of review it remains open and draft, with its changes not merged into main. This is an ongoing engineering workstream, not an independently verified production service.

The PR documentation identifies remaining integrations, including event ingestion, IAM/STS composition, durable workflow state, real-account testing, Terraform plan evaluation and post-deployment verification.

Relationship to InfraGuard Agent

InfraGuard Agent documents the current main-branch API and GitHub PR proposal workflow, including known credential-model and authentication gaps. Neither page claims autonomous production infrastructure mutation.

Inspect the hardening pull request